CASE STUDIES / INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE

REAL PROJECTS.
MEASURABLE IMPACT.

The challenges are rarely new. What matters is recognizing them, choosing the right lever and driving change through to the result.

REAL CHALLENGES / MEASURABLE RESULTS

THE BIGGEST LEVERS SIT BETWEEN DISCIPLINES.

Product architecture, engineering, procurement, suppliers and manufacturing are considered together. This turns individual improvements into a robust overall result.

01
STANDARDIZATION & MODULARIZATION

CUSTOMIZED DOES NOT MEAN
STARTING FROM ZERO.

Over the years, more variants and project-specific solutions had accumulated. The familiar consequences were high engineering effort, recurring design-related quality issues, long onboarding times and increasing exposure to delays and penalties.

THE REALITY
The problem was not a lack of engineering. Too much engineering capacity was tied up in solutions that repeated from project to project.
THE OBJECTIVE

Keep customer-specific performance. Standardize everything that repeats.

BEFORECOMPLEXITY GROWS
  • Many project-specific variants
  • High engineering effort
  • Recurring design-related defects
  • Long onboarding for new engineers
  • Risk of delay and penalties
AFTERSTANDARD CREATES CAPACITY
  • >90% of projects covered by the standard
  • Defined modules and interfaces
  • Reusable engineering documentation
  • Shorter onboarding
  • Repeatable assembly and commissioning
THE DECISIVE LEVER

The work started with customer requirements rather than existing drawings. Functions were separated into modules, interfaces were defined and necessary variants were distinguished from historical variants. Existing solutions were transferred into a modular product structure with design and material specifications and reusable documentation.

IMPACT / 01

NOT MORE ENGINEERING.
MORE EFFECTIVE ENGINEERING.

−67%ENGINEERING BUDGET
−70%QUALITY ISSUES
>90%PROJECTS COVERED
−33%ASSEMBLY TIME
<1 PROJECTROI

Results documented in the project case study. The reduction in quality issues is based on the project survey.

02
SYSTEM SOURCING / COMPLETE ASSEMBLIES

THE COMPANY BOUGHT PARTS.
WHAT IT NEEDED WAS A SYSTEM.

More than 50 separate drawings, multiple suppliers and internal finishing work created constant coordination. Manufacturing status was not transparent and errors often became visible only during incoming inspection or assembly.

THE REALITY
Many individual orders distributed responsibility across numerous interfaces. The company coordinated parts even though the real need was a complete, functioning and tested assembly.
THE OBJECTIVE

Bundle responsibility. Source one complete assembly. Release internal capacity from coordination, rework and inspection.

BEFOREMANAGE PARTS
  • More than 50 separate drawings
  • Multiple suppliers and interfaces
  • Internal painting and piping work
  • Issues found late during incoming inspection or assembly
  • Manufacturing status not transparent
AFTEROWN THE SYSTEM
  • 7 drawings
  • One responsible system supplier
  • Complete and tested assembly
  • Test records before shipment approval
  • 100% manufacturing transparency
THE DECISIVE LEVER

Scope of supply, drawing structure and bills of material were rebuilt. A suitable system supplier assumed responsibility for the complete assembly including painting, covers, piping and lifting equipment. Project structure, quality plan and progress reporting made status and quality visible before shipment.

IMPACT / 02

FEWER INTERFACES.
MORE RESPONSIBILITY.

€500KSAVINGS P.A.
−50%TCO
−50%MANUFACTURING TIME
100%TRANSPARENCY
<1 MO.ROI

Results documented in the extrusion base-frame case study. The concept was transferred to additional frame sizes.

03
SPECIFICATION-BASED SOURCING

NOT EVERY DETAIL NEEDS
TO BE DESIGNED IN-HOUSE.

An installation cabinet required around 200 hours of internal engineering even though specialized sheet-metal design and manufacturing knowledge sat with the supplier. The solution was still designed in-house down to the details.

THE REALITY
The real task was not to make the in-house design faster. The decisive question was: which requirements must we define so the specialist can own the detail work?
THE OBJECTIVE

Control requirements and interfaces internally. Place detail design where specialist knowledge and manufacturing expertise sit.

BEFOREDESIGN EVERY DETAIL
  • In-house detailed design
  • Around 200 engineering hours
  • Standard parts created internally
  • High supplier clarification effort
  • Detail work outside core expertise
AFTERSPECIFY THE RESULT
  • Supplier-neutral specification
  • Around 50 engineering hours
  • Defined interfaces and acceptance criteria
  • Detail design at the specialist
  • Procurement directly from specification
THE DECISIVE LEVER

Detailed drawings were replaced by a supplier-neutral specification. Function, installation dimensions, interfaces, external dimensions and acceptance criteria were defined. The supplier then used its own standards, design methods and manufacturing processes for the detailed solution.

IMPACT / 03

REQUIREMENTS IN-HOUSE.
DETAIL KNOWLEDGE TO THE SPECIALIST.

−75%ENGINEERING
−30%TCO
−3 WLEAD TIME
<1%DEFECTS
<1 MO.ROI

Results documented for the installation-cabinet project. Specification work reduced engineering effort from around 200 to around 50 hours.

04
R&D / CRITICAL MANUFACTURING

WHEN ONE COMPONENT DRIVES THE SCHEDULE,
THE PROCESS MUST BE ROBUST.

A highly loaded component weighing up to 17 tonnes, with up to 800 mm inner diameter and an approximately twelve-month lead time sat on the critical project path. Quality deviations therefore directly affected schedule and project risk.

THE REALITY
For critical long-lead items, final inspection alone is not enough. Errors must be prevented along the manufacturing chain before they threaten the project.
THE OBJECTIVE

Reduce manufacturing risk. Shorten lead time. Secure quality across the complete manufacturing chain.

BEFORERISK ON THE CRITICAL PATH
  • Around 12 months lead time
  • Critical path in the overall project
  • Complex manufacturing steps
  • Demanding quality requirements
  • Deviations threaten delivery
AFTERROBUST PROCESS
  • Aligned technical supply specification
  • Optimized manufacturing and inspection requirements
  • Suitable work packages at specialists
  • Quality plan, audit and reporting
  • Method transferred to comparable components
THE DECISIVE LEVER

Each manufacturing step was reviewed against requirements, known failure modes and prevention measures. Supplier workshops produced aligned specifications, optimized drawings, inspection and documentation requirements. Additional operations moved to specialized partners; audits, quality planning, reporting and expediting supported execution.

IMPACT / 04

DO NOT ONLY INSPECT QUALITY.
PREVENT FAILURE SYSTEMATICALLY.

−20%MANUFACTURING COST
−20%LEAD TIME
✓QUALITY TARGETS
17 tCOMPONENT WEIGHT
12 MO.INITIAL LEAD TIME

Results documented in the R&D case study. The method was subsequently transferred to comparable components.

05
ENGINEERING ORGANIZATION / CAPACITY

EXPERTISE SHOULD DO ENGINEERING.
NOT MANAGE COMPLEXITY.

An engineering organization with 13 people and more than 20,000 annual hours was constrained by extensive internal coordination, capacity bottlenecks and inconsistent order handling. Valuable engineering time was consumed by coordination instead of technical value creation.

THE REALITY
The most valuable employees should not be the people who can best navigate a grown system. Structures must make knowledge accessible and release capacity for technical work.
THE OBJECTIVE

Clarify responsibility. Make capacity transparent. Reduce coordination effort. Use engineering time for engineering again.

BEFORECAPACITY TIED UP IN COORDINATION
  • High internal communication effort
  • Capacity bottlenecks
  • Inconsistent order handling
  • Distributed responsibility
  • Engineering time tied up in coordination
AFTERCAPACITY BECOMES MANAGEABLE
  • Uniform engineering processes
  • Detailed capacity planning
  • Clear communication rules
  • Variable internal and external capacity
  • More team ownership
THE DECISIVE LEVER

Technologies were consolidated organizationally, variants were reduced and a uniform order-engineering process was established. The team developed detailed capacity planning. Communication rules, external engineering capacity and interdisciplinary teams completed the structure and clarified responsibility in daily execution.

IMPACT / 05

STRUCTURE IS NOT AN END IN ITSELF.
IT MUST RELEASE CAPACITY.

€500KENGINEERING COST P.A.
80%OFFERED HOURS REQUIRED
13FTE
>20,000 hCAPACITY P.A.
1UNIFORM ORDER LOGIC

Results documented in the engineering-organization project. The figures describe the project organization and realized cost impact.

REASCENTEC PERFORMANCE

DIFFERENT LEVERS.
SAME OBJECTIVE.

What potential is hidden in your products, processes and supply structures?

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